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The Front national under Marine Le Pen: a mainstream political party? 
 
Introduction 
In 2011, Marine Le Pen (henceforth MLP) was elected leader of the FN, replacing her 
father. Just over a year later, on 22 April 2012, she scored 17.9% of the vote in the 
French Presidential election, coming third in the vote behind Hollande (28.6%) and 
Sarkozy (27.2%).  This was better than the highest score ever achieved by her father, 
the 16.9% he achieved in 2002 (Shields, 2013: 179). In the 2012 parliamentary 
elections, the FN took 13.6% of the first round vote (3.5 million votes), its second 
best ever result.1 It secured 2 seats in parliament after the second ballot, the first 
time since 1988 that it had had more than one MP elected. In March 2014, the party 
won control of a dozen municipalities, including the 7th district in Marseilles, where 
its candidate was elected mayor. Later that year, the FN achieved the largest score 
of any French political party in the European Elections, 24.86% of the vote, winning 
24 of the 74 seats. On 28 September 2014 the party had 2 candidates for the Senate 
elected for the first time. In the first round of the regional elections in 2015, the 
party achieved 28% of the vote, the highest of any party, and although it failed to win 
any seats in the second ballot, it still polled better than ever before in such an 
election. In this year’s Presidential elections, Le Pen came second in the first ballot 
with 21.3% of the vote. Although roundly beaten by Macron in the second ballot, she 
received 33.9% of the vote, 10,638,475 people casting their vote for her. The results 
in the June 2017 legislative elections were disappointing in the wake of this. 
However, the party’s share of the vote in the first ballot was on a par with the 
previous 2012 election, and it won 8 seats making it the ninth largest party. 
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In this context, many commentators have suggested the FN belongs to the political 
mainstream, and thus should no longer be considered a party of the extreme right.2 
Indeed, a poll undertaken during the 2015 regional elections revealed that 57% of 
those polled now saw the FN as a party like any other (France-Info, 2015; see also 
Mondon, 2014: 302). 
This paper argues that although the FN remains part of the extreme right party 
family, this does not prevent it from belonging to the French political mainstream. 
Seeing these two positions as contradictory is the product of the claim that the 
nature and values of the French republic are homogeneous and antithetical to the 
values of the FN. Thus, FN statements which seek to position the party as defending 
the Republic are rejected on the basis that such statements are incompatible with its 
status as an extreme right party. However, although the ideological position of the 
mariniste FN has a high degree of continuity with that of the party under Jean-Marie 
Le Pen (henceforth JMLP), this ideological continuity is perfectly concomitant with 
some form of republicanism. In order to more effectively combat the FN one must 
both recognize this and at the same time articulate an alternative, much more 
inclusive vision of the French Republic, which leaves no space for the vision of the 
Republic articulated by the FN. 
In a first section I summarise ideological developments under MLP, then review the 
academic literature on the discourse of the mariniste FN. This highlights how 
readings of the ideology of the mariniste FN figure a particular relationship between 
the FN and the French republic. A second section will then interrogate the historical 
nature and values of French republicanism, noting that the supposed apotheosis of 
French republicanism in the 1871 foundation of the Third Republic was less 
grounded in universal values than some French republican commentators claim, and 
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that the more recent turn towards a form of national republicanism reflects this 
becoming much more explicit in the face of post-colonialism. On this basis one can 
see how the FN’s articulation of a discourse rooted in a very strong sense of French 
identity and the need for others to assimilate in order to be accepted could be 
perceived as perfectly concomitant with claims to support the Republic. In a final 
section I argue for the contestation of this form of republicanism in order to ground 
the Republic on a much more inclusive basis than that allowed by national 
republicanism. This offers greater potential for undermining FN electoral support. 
 
Approaches to the ‘mariniste’ FN 
How one can ideologically situate the party under the leadership of MLP? One 
rhetorical shift is a toning down of the language, expressed by Alduy and Wahnich 
(2015: 55) as the silencing or muting of some of the more extreme elements of its 
discourse under JMLP.3 This can be seen, for example, in: the absence of references 
to World War 2 or French colonial wars from her speeches; a softening of the party 
stance on social issues: the advocacy of civil unions for same-sex couples (Front 
national, 2016, commitment 87), weaker positions on abortion (Samuel, 2016), and 
on the death penalty;4 the ‘watering down’ of themes such as fear of racial mixing,5 
anticommunism and anti-Americanism (Marian, 2011: 97); the minimal invocations of 
Christian morality.6 This shift is perhaps best exemplified by MLP being the first 
major figure in the FN ever to stigmatize an opponent by calling him a ‘Nazi’ (Reynié, 
2011: 469). 
Alongside this one finds shifts in FN discourse to reflect the socio-economic 
challenges facing voters since the 2008 economic crash, a rise in unemployment, 
sluggish economic growth, and the worsening of public debt in turn feeding new 
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taxes and spending cuts. The crash, together with the fiscal consolidation and 
austerity packages caused by the Eurozone crisis, fuelled public discontent with both 
the national government and the EU, undermining support for the mainstream right 
and left. This created a space for the FN to articulate a programme addressing: the 
fears of those who no longer felt secure, the increased salience of salience of 
financial and economic management, and increased public support for redistribution 
and economic regulation (Ivaldi, 2015: 347-48).7 MLP increased economic references 
in her political discourse to persuade the public she had a credible economic policy 
and to demonstrate her economic competence, but sought to prevent this from 
suggesting submission to a technocratisation of politics which she elsewhere rejected 
through anchoring her economic discourse in the sphere of values, presenting the 
economy as something which should be at the service of the people, not the other 
way around. 
Placing the economy, social protection and France’s economic crises at the centre of 
its programme, the FN promoted such measures as wage increases for those on 
modest incomes, the reindustrialization of France, and the defence of the public 
service (Stockemer and Amengay, 2015: 370-390; Ivaldi. 2015: 355) in opposition to 
what MLP presented as a total, global, supranational State which threatened France.8 
The FN manifesto for the 2014 European election stated that the FN ‘would 
renationalize the CAP, stop the country’s contribution to the European budget, 
introduce taxes at France’s borders, stop all EU bailout plans, regulate the banking 
system, vote against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and fight the 
Posting of Workers Directive’ (Ivaldi, 2015: 358). 
Alongside this economic nationalism MLP defended the French Republic, associated 
with the defence of a certain vision of laïcité (Marian, 2011: 97). MLP’s inaugural 
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speech as leader invoked Jean Jaurès; she claimed that the party could be trusted to 
defend ‘the traditional values of the French Republic’, and stressed laïcité as part of 
the ‘one and indivisible Republic’ (Shields, 2013:192). Her 2017 presidential 
programme, the 144 Commitments, called for the ‘guarantee of freedom of 
expression and numerical liberty through their inscription in the freedoms 
fundamentally protected by the Constitution’, for respect for freedom of association 
to be ‘ensured’, and for the defence of the rights of women. Commitment 95 was to 
‘promote secularism and to struggle against communitarianism’, calling for the 
inscription into the Constitution of the statement that ‘The Republic recognizes no 
community’ (Le Pen, 2017, commitments 7, 9, 10, 11, 95). This economic nationalism 
and defence of the Republic transformed the FN approach to the State, which it 
turned into ‘the central and unified pillar of economic, social, and national recovery’ 
(Alduy and Wahnich, 2015: 43). 
These commitments to the Republic were used to justify the FN anti-immigration 
platform. Mondon (2013: 88) notes that during the 2012 presidential campaign the 
majority of MLP’s rhetoric ‘typically drew links between France’s problems and a 
particular type of immigration’. Amongst the 144 commitments were calls to: make it 
impossible for foreigners in France illegally to be regularised or naturalised, and 
making it easier for them to be automatically expelled; reduce the number of 
immigrants to an annual figure of 10000 through the ending of automatic family 
grouping and reconciliation and of the automatic acquisition of French nationality 
through marriage; end droit du sol, with French nationality to be solely the product of 
filiation or via a naturalization based on ‘more demanding’ conditions. MLP denied 
she was anti-immigrant, linking her rhetoric to the defence of a Republic she claimed 
was threatened by the ‘islamisation of France’ (Shields, 2013:192) in general and by 
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Islamic terrorism in particular. MLP’s 144 commitments included calls for the: 
banning and dissolution of organisations of any kind linked to ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’, and the expulsion of all foreigners with links to these organisations; 
closure of all mosques identified as extremist by the Ministry of the Interior, and a 
ban on all foreign funding of places of worship or their personnel; forfeiture of 
French nationality and the exiling of any dual national belonging to a jihadist group; 
application of article 411-4 of the Penal Code for intelligence with the enemy and 
preventative detention for French nationals with ties to foreign organisations 
provoking acts of hostility or aggression against France or the French; re-
introduction of the crime of l’indignité nationale9 for individuals found guilty of crimes 
or infractions linked to Islamist terrorism. Immigration was MLP’s main theme in the 
final days before the first round ballot of the 2017 Presidential elections, when she 
said she would, if elected, immediately suspend all legal immigration in order to 
reassess the ‘uncontrollable situation’ of immigration, and promised to ban religious 
symbols, including the Muslim headscarf, from all public places (Chrisafis, 2017). Most 
recently, MLP responded to the truck attack in Manhattan by calling on France to be 
‘rearmed against Islamicism’ (Le Pen, 2017). 
Finally, the discursive shift under MLP involved a more developed populism. In 
criticising immigration in the name of the defence of liberal democracy, MLP has 
aligned the party with the populist protest movements that have appeared across 
Europe in the last decade and a half (Reynié, 2011: 467; Marian, 2011: 95-96).10 In 
part this populism is expressed through: a greater likelihood to claim to be speaking 
‘in the name of the people’ – indeed, ‘au nom du peuple’ was the strapline for Le 
Pen’s 2017 presidential campaign; the increasing use of a ‘less party-centred and 
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more personalized’ rhetoric;11 and the much greater use of social media as a means 
of mobilisation (Stockemer and Barisione, 2016). 
These discursive shifts extended the FN’s attraction to voters with low education 
and in blue collar jobs. Such voters increasingly supported the FN from the 1990s 
on, but MLP amplified this attraction (Mayer, 2016).12 MLP also attracted greater 
numbers of women than hitherto, with some suggestion also that the FN is attracting 
more young people (Mayer, 2016).13 Moreover, as Mayer (2016) has shown, this 
attraction was constant: 97% of voters for MLP in the 2012 presidential election 
voted for FN lists in the first round of the 2015 regional elections. 
The failure to follow through from MLP’s strong showing in the first round of the 
2017 presidential elections showed the extent to which the FN still needs to break 
through the “republican front” of mainstream, left and right. This explains the 
subsequent ideological discord within the party, torn between a so-called 
rassemblement patriote of left and right advocated by Florian Philippot14 and a 
rassemblement des droites advocated by Marion le Pen (Domenach, 2017). The key 
tropes of the discord were the Euro, Frexit and immigration.15 MLP realised that 
Frexit was an unpopular position for many centre-right voters, fudging her views on 
Frexit during the campaign for the legislative elections, promising a referendum 
rather than outright Frexit (Ottens, 2017). The unpopularity of elements of the 
programme advocated by Philippot, both electorally and amongst many party 
members, together with the potential to forge better links with elements of the 
Republicans in the light of Macron’s election, perhaps explains MLP’s eventual 
removal from Philippot of his brief as FN Vice-President in charge of strategy and 
communication, leaving him as vice-president without portfolio. This led to the 
departure from the party of Philippot and supporters such as Martel (Philippot, 
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2017). The full ideological impact of the FN’s recognition of the continued need to 
break the “republican front” against it remains to be seen, however,16 and this paper 
does not therefore focus on ideological developments since Macron’s election as 
President. 
 
The FN and the political mainstream 
In the face of the above changes in FN discourse, and the corresponding levels of 
electoral success, there is quite a diverse range of approaches to the issue of 
whether one can see the FN as now part of the political mainstream. Analysis of 
these approaches raises interesting questions about the FN’s relationship to French 
republicanism. 
Mondon (2015: 147) has argued that public acceptance by many people of MLP’s 
claim to incarnate a new form of ‘patriotic’ politics is a product of a ‘lack of historical 
or theoretical analysis of their (and their parties’) ideological trajectories in much 
prominent public commentary as analysis has relied increasingly on survey analysis’. 
This can perhaps be seen in Shields’ reading of the relationship between the FN and 
the ‘mainstream’, which focuses on voting and the party system. He argues that by 
the time JMLP was replaced as leader, the FN had reached the stage of representing 
a voting bloc that could not be described as absolutely extreme right, but as 
representing the radical wing of the right bloc, the difference between the party’s 
voters and those of the moderate right being more a matter of intensity than 
direction (Shields, 2011: 96). Whilst acknowledging the historic anti-system values of 
the party around a fundamental anti-Republicanism (Shields, 2014: 494-495), he 
argues that this anti-Republicanism began to decline from 2002, and reached fruition 
under MLP (Shields, 2013: 191). 
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On the other hand ideological analyses tend to argue that FN programmatic change 
is only at the surface and thus challenge the republican values of the party. Dézé, for 
example, presents the discourse of the mariniste FN as drawing on one of the two 
main ideological variants within the FN in the latter years of JMLP’s leadership: the 
national populism associated with such figures as Bruno Mégret. Thus, MLP’s attempt 
to place at the forefront themes perceived to be new to the FN, such as the theme 
of the ‘social’, merely reproduce the shift away from ultraliberalism to a more social 
focus which took place from the party’s 8th Congress in 1990 onwards (Dézé, 2015: 
35-36), this shift reflecting the triumph of national populism over neo-liberal 
populism (Bastow, 1997, 1998).17 He traces MLP’s use of the ideas of ‘national 
priority’, of secularism, and of the Republic back to the suggestion in the 1980s by 
the then recent transferees from the Parti Républicain (PR) and the Rassemblement 
pour la République (RPR), Jean-Yves Le Gallou and Bruno Mégret, that the party 
adopt the concept of ‘national preference' in order to ‘get around anti-racist 
legislation and make the xenophobic legislation of the frontist organisation more 
acceptable’ (Dézé, 2015: 34). Whilst the references to secularism and the Republic 
‘can certainly give the illusion of an alignment with the norms and values of the 
French institutional system’, breaking away from the discourse of the party under 
JMLP these serve ‘above all as a source legitimating the islamophobic positions of the 
party’. In general, MLP’s use of secularism is intended ‘to better justify the 
discriminatory measures she proposes to take with regard to the Muslim populace’ 
(Dézé, 2015: 34-35. See also Almeida, 2014: 229). Hence, for Dézé the FN under 
MLP is ‘not new, either in its principles or in its modalities’, and remains anti-system 
in character, rejecting ‘the foundations and values of the political system in which the 
FN has evolved’ (Dézé, 2015: 44-47). 
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Dézé’s analysis demonstrates well the ways in which the ideology of the mariniste FN 
has been influenced by national populism, which is useful in understanding some of 
the strategic and ideological tensions in the party since MLP’s perceived relative 
failure after the first round of the presidential election. It is less helpful in analyzing 
the differences between the discourses of JMLP and MLP, however. Other 
ideological analyses, although they come to similar conclusions have been more 
nuanced. A key text in this regard is Alduy and Wahnich’s 2015 Marine Le Pen Prise 
aux Mots, which acknowledges shifts in the form and content of frontist discourse 
under MLP, many of which are noted in the above summary of FN ideology under 
MLP. Their analysis maintains, however, that ultimately this frontist discourse has an 
ideological relationship to the extreme right. Alduy and Wahnich (2015: 32-33, 66) 
argue that, notwithstanding MLP’s attempt to renovate the party’s image it has ‘not 
abandoned … the ‘rhetorical principles of the traditional extreme right’, even making 
the ‘paternal legacy’ of nationalism, national identity, and immigration flourish. Just as 
it is for her father, they argue, for MLP the nation is a ‘closed nation of citizens born 
French of French people’, open only to French nationals (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015: 
45). If MLP uses democratic and republican terms more frequently than did JMLP the 
uses to which they are put reinforce the idea of a closed nation. The term ‘equality’ 
is barely used, but when it is it refers to equality between French citizens. Likewise, 
the term ‘respect’ is used to refer to respect for French identity, whilst the term 
‘liberty’ is largely used to position France vis-à-vis the rest of the world, thus 
inextricably connecting the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘national sovereignty’, and articulating 
a sense of liberty as a collective property which concerns the nation and refers to 
the need for protectionism and security, rather than something individual, referring 
to the rights of man and citizen (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015: 46-48). They conclude 
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that the ‘ideological system and governmental programme’ proposed by MLP is, 
‘despite the surface renovations, in the lineage of the political family of her father, a 
nationalist and xenophobic extreme right’, and that the underlying meaning of her 
discourse is ‘fundamentally the same as that of her father’ (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015: 
244, 248). 
The only differences from her father stem either from the exploration of a domain 
left untouched by the Front national (the economy) or from the decision not to 
venture onto slippery terrain.18 The remainder differs only in the rhetorical 
strategies, in the refreshment of the vocabulary of patriarchy, in the style in which 
nationalism is presented, or in the vocabulary used. Nationalism and xenophobia are 
not revised, amended, or condemned (Alduy and Wahnich, 2015:  245-46). 
 
The ‘Republicanism’ of the mariniste FN 
Notwithstanding the complexity of the arguments underpinning the positions above, 
we are at root faced with two distinct positions. Ideological analysis suggests that the 
FN has changed little, remains antithetical to the values of the Republic, and thus 
should be seen as extremist. Analyses focusing on the party system suggest that it is 
now part of the mainstream, and so should be seen as having embraced the Republic 
and republican values. One way of dealing with this apparent contradiction would be 
to suggest, as does Mondon, that: ‘While the FN had adapted to the new context 
and modernised its rhetoric, it was not so much an ideological change which took 
place, but a change in the way the party was viewed: the mainstream had been 
radicalized more than the extreme had been moderated’ (Mondon, 2014: 311). 
Mondon’s arguments regarding the FN merit a closer analysis as they clarify what is 
at stake in how we view contemporary French republicanism. 
13 
 
Like Dézé, Alduy and Wahnich, Mondon argues that a historical and theoretical 
analysis of the FN demonstrates that ideological change under MLP ‘remained at best 
minimal’ from the ideology of the FN under JMLP (Mondon, 2016: 38). This claim 
draws partly on Alduy and Wahnich, partly on his own analysis of MLP’s campaign in 
the 2012 Presidential elections, on the basis of which he argues that under MLP, 
‘despite an effort at modernising and moderating aspects of the party, the broad lines 
of the programme remained unchanged, still based on a strong anti-immigrant 
sentiment and exaggerated nationalism’ (Mondon, 2013: 87). 
At the same time, however, Mondon (2016: 40) argues that MLP is in the process of 
completing her attempts to normalize the FN, to shift it closer to the mainstream. 
Mondon seeks to reconcile these two statements through the claim that ‘three 
decades of right-wing Gramscism initiated by the Nouvelle Droite and the Front 
National’ (Mondon, 2013: 170), together with the shameless populism of the UMP 
under Sarkozy, mirroring FN policies in an attempt to attract the vote away from 
them, produced a situation in which the mainstream right came to accept a ‘common 
sense’ view that both secularism and the Republic were against Islam. This explains, 
for example, the UMP’s mirroring of the anti-Islamic policies of MLP in the run up to 
the 2012 Presidential election (Mondon, 2013: 169-70) or the radical shifts in the 
interpretation of laïcité post-9/11 to make it predominantly anti-Islam (Mondon, 
2016: 39). These shifts ‘allowed Le Pen to portray herself increasingly as the most 
radical protector of French laïcité, and by extension the Republic’, making her ‘no 
longer the threat to the Republic its enemies could rally against, but its ultimate 
defender’. Indeed, some of the FN’s discriminatory measures against Muslims, and its 
support for secularism, aligned the FN with the mainstream left a well as the right.19 
In turn, the blurring of the distinction between the FN and the mainstream right 
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enabled by this common defence of a laïcité aimed at Islam made it ‘more difficult to 
characterise it [the FN] as “extreme right” without concurrent and lengthy 
definitional and conceptual discussions’. This blurring supported the idea that the FN 
should be seen as a populist party rather than a party of the extreme right, a shift in 
categorisation which the FN was more than happy to accept, as such a term often 
blurs ‘the contours of parties traditionally defined by their position on the right’ 
(Mondon: 2016, p.40). 
Mondon’s approach has a lot of merit, helping to explain how the discourse of the 
FN has become ideologically blurred in ways which facilitate an apparent 
reconciliation with the Republic. The problem with this approach, however, is that it 
assumes that French republicanism was historically homogeneous and inclusive, and 
that it has only shifted away from this in the last thirty years. It logically follows that a 
return by the political mainstream to traditional republican values would undermine 
the FN and reveal it for the extreme right, anti-system party that it really is. It is on 
the basis of these assumptions that it is claimed that the ideology of the FN alienates 
it from the Republic and republican values. In the section which follows I note that 
these assumptions are problematic, that French republicanism is relatively 
heterogeneous, that its proclaimed colour-blindness is an obstacle to inclusivity, and 
that the shift in French republican discourse over the last 30 years or so is a 
reflection of an implicit ethnocentrism of French citizenship being made more 
explicit in the face of the tensions caused by post-colonialism and the emergence of a 
multicultural society. In order to challenge the FN’s position within the republican 
family a more radical and inclusive understanding of French republicanism is 
necessary. 
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Republicanism and citizenship 
Although historiographies of the French republican tradition trace it back to the 
universal values of the French Revolution (Hazareesingh, 1994: 68), and argue that it 
achieved its apotheosis with the development of the Third Republic, associated in 
particular with republican schooling, laïcité, and a unified state, this historiography is 
problematic. It is a long-standing theme of nineteenth-century republican 
historiography that ‘French identity was never rooted in racial or ethnic 
homogeneity’, basing this claim on the argument that France was a ‘large, 
heterogeneous country originally made up of a variety of “Celtic, Iberic, Germanic” 
components’ and that any national unity had been achieved through force from ‘an 
unusual degree of social and cultural diversity’ (Laborde, 2008: 174-75). A basic 
principle of French republicanism is that anyone can become a French citizen, 
whatever their ethnicity. Thus, rather than ethnic bonds or shared descent, 
republicans claim that French national identity is based on citizenship. However, as 
Laborde notes, by the Third Republic ‘French nationality had come to acquire a 
substantive content, in terms of socialization into a common national culture’, and 
official republicans, whilst perhaps disagreeing over the relative weighting of passive 
socialization and expressed desire, ‘all agree that French nationhood, while excluding 
objective blood ties or common descent, involves a mixture of “cultural belonging 
and political will”’, and thus conceive of nationhood as an inclusivist and an 
assimilationist ideal’ (Laborde, 2008: 176-77).20 
This insistence on shared socialization into national culture distanced the French 
republican conception of nationhood from the universalist and contractual 
conception of the nation articulated in the Enlightenment and the 1789 Revolution 
because ‘national culture was intended to function as a civic and democratic bond, the 
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foundation for the affective solidarity binding together the “community of citizens”’’ 
(Laborde, 2008:177-78, emphasis Laborde). In other words, shared cultural 
membership was used to achieve the ideal of political citizenship, harnessing ‘cultural 
identity to the political purpose of constituting a democratic self-governing 
community’. This insistence on shared socialization into national culture is precisely 
what Pierre Rosanvallon refers to, across a vast array of texts,21 as an ‘aspiration to 
unity’ (Rosanvallon, Le modèle politique français, p.24, cited in Chabal, 2015: 179). This 
aspiration was articulated around an essential tension between this unity and a 
radical individualisation contained within the idea of universal suffrage, which saw the 
revolutionary citizen ‘not as a piece in a hierarchical whole’, but as an ‘individual in a 
direct and equal relationship with the nation’ (Chabal, 2015: 179).22 
The counterpart of this search for political citizenship through cultural affinity was 
fear of factional interests (see Jennings, 2006). Laborde notes that during the French 
Revolution republican fear of factionalism ‘was exacerbated by the perceived 
association between corporatist and regionalist movements and counter-
revolutionary forces’, leading Jacobins to call for the drastic reduction of regional, 
occupation, religious, and linguistic powers, sweeping away intermediary powers 
(Laborde, 2008:178-79). The indivisibility of the ‘people’, of the nation, meant that 
identification was not possible with both the nation and sub-categories within the 
nation, at least not without tension.23 It follows from this that there is no specific 
form of integration for immigrants, that all undergo the same process of assimilation, 
and that France is not a multicultural country:24 once Frenchified, the ethnic origins 
of immigrants are supposed to become irrelevant; ethnic or cultural communities 
were never granted public recognition by the state (see Laborde, 2008: 184-85).25 
This is encapsulated in Jennings suggestion that, ‘despite an astonishing level of 
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cultural and ethnic diversity, France has seen itself as and has sought to become a 
monocultural society’ (Jennings, 2000: 575). 
 
National Republicanism and the FN 
The problem with the above approach to citizenship and identity is the nature of the 
monoculture it supports, which is widely seen as validating white French culture as 
the ‘norm’, devaluing non-white cultures at the same time as perpetuating relations 
of domination between white and non-white in French society. There is a wide 
literature from French scholars of colonialism and postcolonialism arguing that the 
aim of assimilation or integration was not naturalization, but the rejection of the 
‘other’ in order to maintain relations of dominance that can be traced back to the 
colonial order (see Hajjat, 2012). This became increasingly explicit in the 1970s and 
early 1980s when it became clear that workers from former colonies, who had been 
expected to remain for a few years then return to their homeland, not only chose to 
stay, but brought over their spouses and settled in France.  The response to this was 
a revival of the tradition of ‘republican integration and national citizenship’ by many 
republican thinkers in the form of a national républicanisme.26 This theorized 
assimilation as the keystone of a ‘French model of national integration’ (Laborde, 
2008: 185), a stance marking France out from other countries during this period, 
when most Western countries were moving away from assimilationism and 
embracing some form of multiculturalism. 
The republican response to multiculturalism then, articulated in such academic 
works as Schnapper’s, La France de l’intégration, Taguieff’s,  La force du préjugé, and 
Noirel’s, Le creuset français, as well as in the official reports of the Nationality 
Commission and the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, was to ‘revive’ the tradition of 
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‘republican integration and national citizenship’, emphasising ‘the need to articulate a 
“strong, … but non-ethnic … French identity” capable of providing a focus of 
affective solidarity in a context of fears of social breakdown and national decline’ 
(The Long Report, cited in Laborde, 2008:186). This national républicanisme 
introduced a model of integration27 with two key tenets: that most immigrants 
became assimilated into French culture over a few generations at most; and that 
‘integration had been a success because immigrants genuinely wanted to participate 
in French society and become French’ (Laborde, 2008: 188-89). This model allowed 
only for the transitory continuation of particular cultures, their long-term 
continuation held to ghettoise such communities, and thus exacerbate their 
marginalization and stigmatization.28 
The cumulative impact of this national-républicanism was a set of collective practices 
and discourses surrounding the treatment of immigrants including a ‘set of repressive 
and humiliating methods … to which all foreigners catalogued as “immigrants” are 
subjected on a daily basis’ (Balibar and Swenson, 2009: 36). Such collective practices 
and discourses intensified due to the increasingly visible signs of multiculturalism in 
France as a result of changes in social composition brought about by both the 
resumption of immigrant flows in the second half of the 1990s and ‘the transition to 
adulthood of the second generation of immigrants who arrived in the 1960s and 
1970s’.29 Thus, under Sarkozy, the passing of Immigration Acts in 2003,30 2006,31 and 
2007, reasserted the ‘pre-eminent role of national identity in fostering social 
cohesion’, ‘toughening’ the clause regarding the duty of immigrants in the ‘republican 
contract and instrumentalizing national identity for exclusionary purposes’, giving 
prominence to the question of loyalty in the debate on national identity. 
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Rather than integrating the non-white other into a monocultural Frenchness, 
however, national republicanism has problematised the possibility of non-whites ever 
being truly French. This can be seen in the tendency to label children and 
grandchildren born in France as “second- or third-generation immigrants”. The 
incorporation of jus soli in nationality law means that the children of North African 
immigrants theoretically have the same rights as any French citizen. However, as 
Bouamama and Tevanian (2013: 527) note the children of North African or sub-
Saharan African immigrants are the only French citizens to be ‘condemned to the 
absurd—but politically eloquent—appellation of “second-or third-generation 
immigrants” and the accompanying forms of discrimination’. This reinforces their 
claim that the children of North African or sub-Saharan African immigrants suffer 
from a ‘specific kind of racism that has been constructed in order to legitimize 
colonial aggression and privilege’, based on an essentialization and naturalization of 
the Muslim ‘other’. It highlights cultural differences from the white majority whilst at 
the same time minimizing differences within the majority around such issues as social 
class, and has been passed down through the generations since the development of 
the colonial order.32 
The outcomes of the national republican model of integration demonstrate that 
French republicanism is insufficiently accessible and inclusive to accommodate 
diversity from the French “norm”. As Jennings’ puts it: ‘A rationalist universalism, 
rooted in the philosophy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, now looks more 
and more like a form of European ethnocentrism, and thus like a form of domination 
rather than liberation’ (Jennings, 2000: 579). French republicanism is itself subject to 
many of the tensions around identity articulated by the FN, indeed is complicit with 
the othering of immigrants from former colonies. This explains the ability of the 
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mainstream right – and frequently the left – to adopt terminology around national 
identity in an attempt to attract the FN vote in more recent years. The national 
republican model of integration ‘endorsed’ the far right’s ‘concerns for the crisis of 
national identity and seeming “desacrilisation” of French citizenship’, even as it 
articulated a vision of Frenchness which sought to exclude the FN (Laborde, 2008: 
187). At the same time it reinforced the image of the immigrant as a burden on 
French society (Simon, 2013: 207), and assisted the FN’s credence in presenting its 
strategy of ‘national priority’, which as we have seen is but a repackaging of its long-
standing policy of national preference (Balibar and Swenson, 2009: 39). 
 
Concluding remarks: Challenging the FN through challenging national-
républicanisme 
It follows from the above that FN discourse can be aligned with French 
republicanism, the latter being not only blind to the racism of French culture to 
which all immigrants are supposed to assimilate, but actively preventing action to 
oppose practices of ethnic discrimination, including labour market discrimination or 
institutional racism (Laborde, 2008: 211), on the basis that mobilization around 
ethnic issues prevents integration. To take employment as one of the indicators of 
this discrimination, we can note the large body of research demonstrating labour 
market discrimination against the children of immigrants, particularly of those whose 
parents hail from the Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa (for example, Meurs, Pailhé & 
Simon, 2006; Duguet, Léandri, L’Horty, and Petit, 2010; Duroy, 2011; Pierné, 2012; 
and Aeberhardt & Rathelot, 2013). Against explanations which attribute inequalities 
in labour market access to differences in social environment or educational level, 
Aeberhardt, Rathelot and Safi’s (2015) analysis of the interrelationship between the 
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labour market, education and geographical location in the attainment of young 
people of immigrant background demonstrates that ‘ethnic origin plays a decisive 
role’ in explaining the magnitude of differences in the labour market between the 
children of African immigrants and those of French-born parents. FN racism should 
then be seen as part of a broader set of racist practices within a specific republican 
dispositif rather than as something radically separate from it. National republicanism 
seems to me to be perfectly compatible with the main features of FN discourse, and 
this explains how the FN can be seen both as part of the mainstream whilst 
remaining a party united by a form of extreme right political discourse, and as a party 
one can support without abandoning allegiance to proclaimed republican values. 
This suggests that what is at stake in assessing the ideological bearings of the FN is 
the nature of republican identity and values. National republicanism is not a 
‘moderate’ set of ideas, as can be seen from the practices introduced in its name 
under Sarkozy,33 or from the warnings about ‘Islamic totalitarianism’ and tough line 
on French national identity articulated by François Fillon in his abortive candidature 
for French presidency. Fillon drew a clear distinction between ‘integration’ as that 
necessary for people wishing to establish themselves in France, and assimilation as a 
‘necessity’ for people ‘wishing to acquire French nationality’, the failure to demand 
this ‘risking the overthrow of French society and provoking very strong community 
tensions’, a redrawing of the distinction in this way ‘returning the descendants of 
postcolonial immigration to their permanent state of “immigritude” and 
“foreignness”,  through their morals, their values, their attitudes and their behaviour 
closer to foreigners than to “true French people”’ (Geisser, 2016: 9). 
Rather than focusing on whether the discourse of the mariniste FN is part of the 
mainstream, one should focus instead on the wider struggle around the nature of 
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French republicanism, seeking to reimagine republicanism in ways which make it 
more inclusive of otherness. As Achille Mbemba has argued the conflation ‘between 
colonial modes of control, treatment, and segregation, the treatment in metropolitan 
France of men and women judged undesirable, and the treatment of citizens 
considered to be second-class simply because they are not “French of pure stock” or 
“of the white race”’, reflects the fact that France has refused ‘to undertake its own 
decolonization’ (Mbemba, 2009: 52, 56). 
Decolonizing, the French Republic to make it adequate to the integration of the 
diverse identities of the 21st century, is possible through re-articulating it around the 
neo-republicanism associated with such figures as Skinner (2002) and Pettit (1997). 
Neo-republicanism contends that republicanism is rooted in the conception of 
liberty as non-domination (Audier, 2004, pp. 71, 72-74; Urbinati, 2012, p.607). On 
the basis of just such a vision of liberty in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
liberal socialists argued that true republican freedom required some form of equality 
of opportunity then prevented by the economic disparities found under capitalism 
(see Spitz, 2005; Bastow, forthcoming).  Likewise, in the twenty-first century, as 
‘critical Republicans’ like Laborde have argued, it is possible to demonstrate that a 
republic based on non-domination is contradicted by the ways the Republic, in 
making invisible the ethnic and racial discriminatory practices of the French Republic 
and in proscribing mobilization around ethnicity, serves to legitimize discrimination 
(Laborde, 2008: 16).34 Reinscribing the ideal of liberty as non-domination – which 
was fundamental to the French Revolution, and is the basis for the unity of liberté, 
égalité, fraternité – in the practice of the French Republic implies breaking apart the 
political unity of the nation from the idea of cultural unity, this union feeding 
assimilationist and integrationist logics, to focus instead on equality between all 
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citizens (see Bouamama and Wahnick, 2009). This will provide a way for 
republicanism to better cater for the diverse social elements which make up the 
French 21st century ‘people’, ensuring that French citizens of North African and sub-
Saharan descent feel they have a stake in society. A republican strategy articulating 
the ‘citizen’ around the concept of ‘non-domination’ is the best way to deal with the 
national republicanism both of the FN and of the right-wing orthodoxy around such 
figures as Sarkozy and Fillon which feeds support for the ideas of the FN. 
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1 The FN received 14.9%, 3.8 million votes, in the 1997 parliamentary elections. 
2 The specificity of FN ideology has long been a matter of dispute. Some critics historically identified 
FN ideology as ‘fascist’ or ‘neo-fascist’ (see Fysh & Wolfreys, 1992: 325; Husbands, 1992: 267; Eatwell, 
1995: 258), but issues with such a classification (see, for example, Milza, 1987: 431-33) and the 
diversity of the internal components of the FN – including integral nationalists, neo-fascists, nouvelle 
droitistes, and radical Catholics (see Camus, 1996; Algazy, 257-62) – meant that the majority of 
analysts identified the party as belonging to the extreme right. Notwithstanding both the conceptual 
difficulties in identifying the key ideological components of the extreme right (see Mudde, 1996; 2000: 
7-11), the fact that some elements within the party have always been closer to the traditional right 
(see Bastow, 2002: 89), and the more recent literature linking the party to radical right wing populism, 
I shall use term ‘extreme right’ to refer to the ideology of the FN throughout the article. 
3 Though they suggest this silence does not necessarily imply the denunciation of such elements. 
4 MLP’s 2017 presidential election programme omitted any call for a referendum on this issue 
5 Though if MLP does not, like her father, articulate a belief in natural, biological difference Alduy and 
Wahnich (2015: 56) argue she nevertheless ‘conserves the idea of transcendence and rootedness’. 
6 Although she evokes the idea of ‘Christian civilisation’ as a principal kernel of French identity (Alduy 
and Wahnich, 2015: 57). 
7 MLP does this above all through her critique of the ‘ultraliberal’ economic model, and its ideology, 
‘globalisation’. In this way she seeks to link her discourse on the economic to an ideological, even 
civilizational struggle. See Alduy and Wahnich (2015: 35-41). 
8 In so doing, as Alduy and Wahnich note (2015: 45), ‘surreptitiously gliding’ between the terms ‘State’ 
and ‘nation’ as if they were the same. MLP’s 144 Engagements for the 2017 Presidential election 
identified the ‘enemy’ of the people as globalists, who sought ’ever greater immigration and less 
cohesion between the French people’ 
9 An offense created at the Liberation to take into account reprehensible behaviours which occurred 
during the Occupation and in the Vichy regime not covered by the laws on treason or murder in 
place at the start of WW2. It ceased to be an offence in 1951. 
10 For a useful summary of the FN’s ideological positioning in relation to the European Radical Right 
see Ivaldi (2016). 
11 Stockemer and Barisione (2016: 5) note that MLP’s 2012 presidential programme ‘was not 
presented as a party programme but rather as Marine’s “personal” project’, a personification starting 
with the title of the programme: ‘My Project, for France and for the French people’ and ‘Marine Le 
Pen, the voice of the people, the spirit of France’. This personification continued with her 2017 
presidential programme, presented as a series of 144 commitments she made ‘Au nom du people’, 
and ending with a handwritten sentence signed by MLP. 
12 Goodliffe (2011: 280-309) links this trend both to the structural transformation of the French 
economy since the early1980s, which ‘had a catastrophic impact on the political and sectoral 
organizations, notably the Communist Party and trade unions, which had bound, from the 1930s on, 
the French working class to the republican order’, increasing their occupational vulnerability, and to 
cultural change, notably the erosion of class identity. See also Goodliffe (2016: 128). 
13 A survey prior to the 2017 presidential election showed that 30% of first time voters planned to 
vote Le Pen, with male first time voters more likely to vote Le Pen than female ones (35% against 
26%). The proportion increased if the voter was working class, even more if they were unemployed 
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(60% of unemployed first time voters against 36% of the unemployed as a whole). See Chaillou et al 
(2016: 19-20). 
14 FN Vice-President in charge of strategy and communication and MLP’s right-hand man, widely 
credited as co-author with MLP of the strategy of normalizing the FN. 
15 Philippot and figures around him argued that the party needed to make the issue of French control 
of its own currency a red line (de Boni, 2017): without a national currency there could be ‘no 
economic patriotism, no possible control of our democracy’ (Albertini, 2017a). Philippot claimed the 
presidential and legislative elections demonstrated that FN voters weren’t concerned about the idea 
of quitting the Euro (Galiero, 2017). Figures hostile to Philippot’s strategy argued that the Presidential 
and legislative elections saw the people reject the idea of France quitting the Euro and thus suggested 
the party needed to re-evaluate its stance around Europe and the single currency (Albertini, 2017a). 
Philippot and his supporters at the same time called on the party to become less strident on 
immigration. Julien Acard – the FN representative of the Bourgogne-Franche-Comté region who was 
suspended by the party from this role in summer 2017 – suggested the party needed to ‘put an end to 
anxiety-inducing speeches, particularly on immigration and insecurity’ (Albertini, 2017a). The MEP, 
Sophie Montel argued: ‘On immigration, the choice of words is important. Some express things in a 
caricatural way and I worry about their will to reinforce even more the place of this subject in the 
discourse of the FN’ (Albertini, 2017b). 
16 To give just one example, a seminar on the Euro held during the summer put back the exit from the 
Euro to an unspecified date and made it less of a party priority. Whilst there is speculation that this 
will eventually lead to the party quietly dropping the idea, nothing more concrete has been announced 
thus far (see Escalona, 2017). 
17 These groupings were identified by Betz (1994) as variants of what he called Radical Right Wing 
Populism. 
18 Such as her repeated avoidance of any clear position on the issue of abortion on general, or of 
challenging the Veil Law on abortion, of any discussion of such feminist issues as equal pay, or the use 
of such phrases as ‘the cause of women’(Alduy and Wahnich, 2015: 53-54). 
19 Le Pen’s articulation of the rights of women as a struggle against ‘islamicism, which reduces their 
fundamental freedoms’ (Le Pen, 2017, commitment 9) was also articulated by the political mainstream 
in its critique of the veil. See for example, chapters 7 and 10 of Delphy, 2016. On the transformation 
of the meaning of laïcité in recent years see Baubérot (2012), and Daly (2013). 
20 This perhaps facilitated the move of Republican values to centre stage during the Third Republic, in 
being ‘adopted by a wide variety of groups (such as the Orleanists) who had hitherto been opposed 
to republicanism and democratisation’ (Chabal, 2015: 13). 
21 Key texts include his Le sacre du citoyen (1990), Le peuple introuvable (1998), and La démocratie 
inachevée (2000). 
22 Thus, for Rosanvallon: ‘The Revolution is seen to sanctify the individual while simultaneously making 
unity the inalienable goal of the revolutionary project’ (Chabal, 2015: 179). It is precisely because of 
this ambiguity within modern democracy that Rosanvallon sees democracy as a project, therefore 
open and incomplete. This ambiguity underpins the resistance to Jacobinism through the attempts to 
recover space for intermediary bodies (which Rosanvallon presents as French liberalism). See Chabal 
(2015: 181); Dimier (2004). 
23 This explains why historians such as Weber believe that a republic which is one and indivisible can 
‘only be reached (and was reached) through violent assimilation and centralisation’ (Dimier, 2004: 
838; Jennings 2000: 578), and underpins the late 19th century and early 20th century struggles around 
regionalism, various forms of corporatism, solidarism, and syndicalism (see Spitz, 2012: 253). 
24 This is the traditional republican narrative of “colour-blind” integration’, according to which 
problems of immigration are presented as ‘social’ rather than ‘ethnic’ problems (Chabal, 2015: 84). 
25 The 2011 report by the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, La France sait-elle encore intégrer les immigrés?, 
after summarising the history of immigration into France since the 19th century, argues that: ‘All 
foreigners, whatever the difficulties they faced might have been, were progressively integrated until 
they dissolved into the French nation, they and their descendants all the more’ (Haut Conseil à 
l’Intégration, 2011: 21). 
26 A term affirming that the nation-state is the limiting framework of the republic and democracy, and 
drawing on the Jacobin republican tradition. 
27 A term preferred to ‘assimilation’ in official discourse, seen as having ‘repressive and colonial 
overtones’, integration on the other hand being seen as a ‘less coercive’ and ‘less pervasive’ term, and 
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therefore as being ‘more respectful of immigrants’ cultures’ (Laborde, 2008: 188; Simon, 2013: 209). 
The High Council for Integration’s defined ‘integration’ in 1993 as consisting in: 
‘… fostering the active participation in the society as a whole, of all women and men who 
will be living permanently on our soil, by accepting without ulterior motives the persistence 
of specificities, particularly of a cultural nature, but emphasizing the similarities and 
convergences in the equality of rights and duties, in order to ensure the cohesion of our 
social fabric … It postulates the participation of differences in a common project and not, 
like assimilation, their elimination, or on the contrary, as with inclusion, the guarantee that 
will ensure their long-term survival (HCI, L’intégration à la française, 1993, cited in Simon, 
2013: 208-209). See also HCI, 2016. 
 
It is noteworthy that commitment 98 of Le Pen’s 2017 Presidential election campaign called for the 
‘Promotion of Republican assimilation, a more demanding principle than that of integration’. In 
practice, however, Simon argues, the distinction between assimilation and integration is much more 
ambivalent (Simon, 2013: 209).  
28 Simon suggests that visible signs of multiculturalism in French society problematize integration, with 
‘concrete signs of belonging to ethno-cultural or religious minorities in the public arena’ being ‘rapidly 
stigmatized as an expression of “communitarianism”’, leading to calls for such groups ‘to return to the 
collective norm’, and concentrations of ethnic minorities in deprived neighbourhoods being presented 
as threats to national cohesion. The ‘ghetto’ is treated here, says Simon, ‘as a source of “identitarian 
closure”’ (Simon, 2013: 209). 
29 Simon points to a pronounced shift in the geographical origin of immigrants: up until 1975 63% 
were European, with only 27% North and sub-Saharan African, but in the last 10 years ‘the 
overwhelming majority of newcomers have arrived from North and sub-Saharan Africa and Asia’. This 
visibility of the non-European immigrant not only makes them ‘vulnerable to longer-lasting 
discriminations than those once directed at European immigrants’, but ‘challenges the main purpose of 
the integration model which is to assimilate outsiders into to national body politic by making them 
similar’ (Simon, 2013: 210). 
30 This Act ‘required immigrants to demonstrate their “republican integration”’ to gain right of 
residence, the link between integration and immigration no longer something to be acquired over 
time, but needing to be demonstrated as already being possessed in order to enter the country 
(Simon, 2013: 208). 
31 This Act made compulsory a ‘reception and integration contract’, signed with the issuing of the first 
residence permit. This included ‘a commitment to live by the values and laws of the Republic, a civic-
education training day and a language test’, and acted, Simon claims, ‘as an indirect method for 
selecting on the basis of ethnic origin, since these criteria tend to favour – on a cultural basis – certain 
profiles of immigrants deemed easier to assimilate than others’ (Simon, 2013: 208). 
32 Producing what Delphy has called a system of racial castes whereby the children of North African 
immigrants ‘have “inherited” their parents’ social inferiority’, leaving them with no possibility of social 
mobility (Delphy, 2016: 76). 
33 As well as from some of his comments in 2016 as part of his campaign to become the official 
candidate of Les Républicains, notably those concerning burkinis. See, for example, Chrisafis, 2016a, 
Chrisafis and Farrar, 2016. 
34 The ties between the republican treatment of the class struggle in the 19th century and that of 
struggles concerning ethnicity in the contemporary period can be seen in the mainstream republican 
rejection of the Communard notion of the Universal Republic. Ross points out, for example, that the 
‘othering’ of the Commune through associating it with the International facilitated the development of 
a nationalist vision of the Republic: ‘“Othering” on the part of the Versaillais, their perception of or 
need to perceive the Communards as “less French” (and thus easier to kill) was in this sense part of 
the historical tendency of the dominant classes to exhibit class racism, considering workers as, in fact, 
foreign to the nation’ (Ross, 2016: 31). 
